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Expensed investments are expenditures ﬁnanced by the owners of capital that increase future proﬁts
but, by national accounting rules, are treated as an operating expense rather than as a capital
expenditure. Sweat investment is ﬁnanced by worker-owners who allocate time to their business
and receive compensation at less than their market rate. Such investments are made with the
expectation of realizing capital gains when the business goes public or is sold. But these investments
are not included in GDP. Taking into account hours spent building equity while ignoring the output
introduces an error in measured productivity and distorts the picture of what is happening in
the economy. In this paper, we incorporate expensed and sweat equity in an otherwise standard
business cycle model. We use the model to analyze productivity in the United States during the
1990s boom. We ﬁnd that expensed plus sweat investment was large during this period and critical
for understanding the dramatic rise in hours and the modest growth in measured productivity.
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Reserve System.1. Introduction
A signicant amount of business investment is not included in national accounts. Some
of the unaccounted investment is expensed against prots. Expensed investments are ex-
penditures nanced by the owners of capital that increase future prots but, by national
accounting rules, are treated as an operating expense rather than as a capital expenditure.
Examples include research and development, advertising, and investments in building orga-
nizations. Some of the unaccounted investment is sweat. Sweat investment is nanced by
worker-owners who allocate time to their business and receive compensation at less than
their market rate. Such investments are made with the expectation of realizing capital
gains when the business goes public or is sold.
By not accounting for investments in expensed and sweat equity, the standard measure
of productivity distorts the picture of what is happening in the economy during times of
changing investment. The standard measure of aggregate productivity is gross domestic
product (GDP) per hour worked. Output is understated by GDP because expensed and
sweat investments are not accounted for in the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) measure of product. This exclusion corresponds to lower
prots and compensation in the BEA's measure of income. If the importance of these
unaccounted investments relative to GDP remained constant over time, growth in GDP
per hour would be equal to growth in actual output produced per hour worked. But, in the
late 1990s, the relative importance of these investments varied a lot in the U.S. economy.
If macroeconomists were to look at the U.S. economy through the lens of a theory
that abstracts from expensed and sweat equity, they would nd the observations in the late
1990s puzzling. In the late 1990s, GDP grew rapidly. But hours grew even more rapidly
implying weak productivity growth. The movements in total factor productivity (TFP),
eective tax rates, and the Federal Funds rate are either too small or of the wrong sign to
account for the dramatic changes in output and hours that occurred.
1In this paper, we incorporate expensed and sweat equity into an otherwise standard
model and use the model to analyze output and hours in the United States during the 1990s.
The business sector in our model has two technologies available: one for producing nal
goods and services and one for producing intangible capital. Although most investment
in expensed and sweat equity is intangible and not directly observable, the magnitudes of
these investments can be inferred with the aid of our theory and data from the U.S. national
income and product accounts (NIPA). We nd that this investment is large, particularly
during the late 1990s when industry R&D grew rapidly and initial public oerings (IPOs)
and company acquisitions boomed.1 Our estimate of intangible (expensed plus sweat)
investment in the business sector is a little over 0.03 GDP during the early 1990s, rising
to over 0.08 GDP at the peak of the boom.
We conduct two tests of the theory. The rst test is a check on the consistency of
the equilibrium of our model. We use rst order conditions of the model and observations
from NIPA to determine allocations of factor inputs and TFPs across sectors. We then
ask, If households in the model economy were confronted with these time paths for sectoral
TFPs, would the model deliver responses closely in line with U.S. time series? We nd
that it does.
The second test, which is more demanding, is a comparison of the model's prediction
for holding gains as measured in the U.S. Flow of Funds (FOF) accounts with the FOF's
estimate for the U.S. economy. Holding gains are the dierence between the end-of-period
net worth and the sum of the beginning-of-period net worth and net investment. The
holding gains of households, subtracting gains for real estate, should move closely with
our model intangible gains during the 1990s period. Thus, we ask, Are holding gains in
the model of similar magnitude to the Flow of Funds estimates? We nd that the two
1 Samuelson and Varian (2002) estimate industry R&D growth at 8.5 percent per year between 1994
and 2000. During the same period, gross proceeds of IPOs grew 22 percent per year and announced
merger and acquisition volume grew 34 percent per year according to data from SDC.
2measures are close. We emphasize that observations on U.S. holding gains were not used
to construct our estimates of sector TFPs.
In order to get a more accurate picture of the U.S. economy in the late 1990s, we use
our model to compare accounting measures for output, investment, and productivity with
analogues that include expensed and sweat investment. Solow's (1987) remark that \you
can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics" is pertinent for our
ndings. The model predicts lackluster productivity performance if accounting measures
are used and a boom for productivity if expensed and sweat investments are included.
From this, we conclude that ignoring these intangible investments gives a distorted picture
of the U.S. economy in the late 1990s.
Our analysis deals directly with the criticism of Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), who
argue that intangible investments \are not well captured by traditional macroeconomic
measurement approaches." The traditional approaches they refer to are growth-accounting
approaches such as that of Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) and Oliner and Sichel (2000). Here,
we explicitly model the intangible investments and use our theory to infer their size.
2. Standard Theory and the Prediction for Hours
We start with the standard growth model used in the study of business cycles. We derive a
prediction for hours of work and show that it is grossly at odds with the fact that U.S. hours
rose dramatically during the 1990s. We investigate the failure of the theory and use the
failure to motivate our theory introducing expensed and sweat equity.
In the standard growth model, given initial capital stock k0, the problem for the





t[logct +   log(1   ht)]Nt
3subject to
ct + xt = rtkt + wtht   Tt (2:1)
kt+1 = [(1   k)kt + xt]=(1 + ); (2:2)
where variables are written in per capita terms and Nt = (1 + )t is the population in
t. There is also growth in technology at a rate 
. Capital is paid rent rt and labor is
paid wage wt. Capital depreciates at rate k. The term Tt is the sum of all taxes less all
transfers.





to produce goods sold to the household. Capital letters in this case denote aggregates. The
parameter At is the technology parameter that varies over time. The rms rent capital
and labor at rates equal to the marginal products of capital and labor, respectively.
Finally, the goods market clears if Nt(ct + xt) = Yt. Here, we assume that c includes
both private and public consumption, and we assume that x includes both private and
public investment.
Let ct be the tax rate on consumption, and let ht be the tax rate on wage income
wtht. The household's intratemporal condition, relating the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and the after-tax real wage, depends on these rates and
can be written as
 (1 + ct)ct
1   ht




where yt is per-capita output. From the U.S. national accounts, we have data for total
consumption c, output y, and the tax receipts needed to estimate tax rate ct and ht.2
2 The sources of national account data that we use are the Board of Governors (1945{2005) and
the U.S. Department of Commerce (1929{2005). See Appendix A for more details. Tax rates are
estimated as in Prescott (2004).

















We compare this predicted series to the actual hours of work per-capita.3
In Figure 1, we plot predicted and actual per-capita hours of work as an index, with
1990 equal to 1. The predicted series is (2:5) with  = 0:34 and   = 1:33. The dierence
between the series is striking. In the United States, hours per capita rose 8 percent between
1992 and 1999, more than 1 percent per year. The predicted series actually falls during
this period, primarily because of a rise in ht. To account for an 8 percent rise in hours in
(2:5), the tax rate on hours would have had to fall 5 percentage points.
The fact that the series in Figure 1 do not track each other means that the intratem-
poral condition (2:4) does not hold.4 If there is an error measuring either the output y
or the labor input h, then we should expect a deviation in this condition. In the next
section, we show evidence that leads to a particular extension of the basic theory: one that
incorporates unmeasured intangible investments.
3. The 1990s Boom
To motivate our extension of the growth model, we document changes that occurred in the
U.S. economy that point us in the direction of increased intangible investment. The rst
set of changes is related to the technology (or \high-tech") boom. During the 1990s, there
was a large increase in industry R&D, IPOs, and mergers and acquisitions. The second
set of changes is related to movements in factor inputs. The increase in hours occurred in
certain occupations and factor incomes fell during the boom period.
3 The source of hours and population is the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey,
and is described in detail in Prescott, Ueberfeldt, and Cociuba (2005).
4 There is also a deviation in the condition relating the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion today and tomorrow and the marginal rate of transformation. But this intertemporal deviation
is small in comparison to the intratemporal deviation.
5In Figure 2, we plot total funding of R&D performed by industry reported by the
National Science Foundation (1953{2003). Between 1994 and 2000, expenditures nearly
doubled, rising from $107 billion to $198 billion. A lot of this investment is expensed by
corporations and, thus, does not show up in either national product or national income.
If the hours put in by researchers is counted, then productivity measures are distorted.
In Figure 3, we plot gross proceeds from IPOs compiled from Thomson Financial
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database.5 Although there are 
uctuations in the
series, the trend is clear. there was much more IPO activity in the 1990s than there was
in the 1980s. Proceeds from IPOs could have been used as part or full income to business
owners starting new businesses. If that is the case, we would expect that compensation and
prots recorded in the national accounts understate true compensation and true prots.
Other related evidence available from the SDC database is the volume of announced
mergers and acquisitions. In Figure 4, we plot this volume for the period 1994{2003. The
volume rose from $0.6 trillion in 1994 to $3.4 trillion by 2000. As in the case of IPOs,
if large payments to shareholders or worker-owners are made at the time a business is
acquired, then NIPA measures of income understate true income.
Figures 5 and 6 are evidence from the U.S. national accounts that incomes were
unexpectedly low during the boom period. In Figure 5, we plot average weekly hours of
work for the noninstitutional population, aged 16 to 64 (the same number of hours as
those in Figure 1). We also plot the wage rate corresponding to these hours, which is
computed as follows. We take NIPA compensation and de
ate it by the GDP de
ator. We
then detrend for population growth by dividing real compensation by population. Finally,
because there is technological growth, we divide the wage rate by the factor 1:02t, where t
indexes time. For all of the 1990s, NIPA real, detrended compensation per hour is below
5 See also Table 1 in Ritter and Welch (2002).
6the 1990 level, despite the fact that there was a boom in hours.6
In Figure 6, we compare NIPA GDP and corporate prots, both de
ated by the GDP
de
ator and detrended so that they do not grow with population or technology. We see
that prots are falling (relative to trend) in the late 1990s when GDP, R&D, and capital
gains are high.
Evidence in Figures 2 through 6 suggests that during the 1990s boom, business owners
made large unmeasured investments and made large gains on those investments. The data
on hours suggest that the large increase in hours was concentrated among a small group of
workers. In Figure 7, we plot hours for all workers and the hours for a subset of workers.
Both series are divided by the population aged 16 through 64.7 In the subgroup, we
exclude educated workers (with at least one year of college) who are in certain occupations.
These occupations include most managers and proprietors, computer analysts, and certain
workers in nancial elds.8 Our aim was to focus on workers that may be making large
unmeasured investments. We refer to them as the \sweat" group. Notice that the \non-
sweat" group is large, making up roughly 90 percent of the weekly hours. However, that
group contributes only half of the increase in hours. In other words, the small \sweat"
group is only about 10 percent but was responsible for half of the increase in hours.
We turn next to an extension of the standard theory described in Section 2.
6 In an earlier paper, we abstract from sweat equity and treat NIPA compensation as true labor income.
Doing so understates the estimate of total intangible investment in both expensed and sweat equity.
See McGrattan and Prescott (2005b).
7 The data in Figure 7 are compiled from the March supplement of the Current Population Survey.
Thus, there are slight dierences between the hours series in Figure 1, which is an average of all
months, and Figure 7, which is based on the March sample.
8 Specically, using data from IPUMS (www.ipums.org), we split workers into two groups: those with
variable EDUCREC greater than or equal to 8 and variable OCC in the set f4, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 18,
21, 22, 34, 37, 64, 65, 229, 23, 24, 25, 225g and the remainder.
74. A Theory of Expensed and Sweat Equity
In this section, we modify the standard growth model by including a second activity:
intangible investment. For the sake of exposition, we say that households are creating new
intangible capital or using productive time. The accumulated intangible capital is used in
market production and in accumulating new intangible capital.
We modify the problem of the household, allowing for two types of investment: tan-
gible investment that is a nal good reported in the national accounts and intangible
investment that is not reported in the national accounts. Gross domestic product in the
economy is the sum of total consumption (public plus private) and tangible investment






mt is measured tangible capital, Kut is unmeasured intangible capital, and H1
t is
hours. The parameter A1
t is the technology parameter that varies over time. A second











where Xut is total intangible investment, K2
mt is tangible capital used to produce intangible
capital, Kut is intangible capital, H2
t is hours, and A2
t is the technology parameter. The
superscripts 1 and 2 index the technologies. Notice that intangible capital is not split
between production and building intangible capital. The total is used in both.





t[logct +   log(1   ht)]Nt
subject to
ct + xmt + qtxst = rmtkmt + rutkut + wtht + Trt
8  ctct   ht(wtht   (1   )qtxut)   ktkmt   xtxmt
  ptfrmtkmt + rutkut   mkmt   qtxut   ktkmtg
  dtfrmtkmt + rutkut   xmt   qtxut   ktkmt
  pt(rmtkmt + rutkut   mkmt   qtxut   ktkmt)   xtxmtg
kmt+1 = [(1   m)kmt + xmt]=(1 + ) (4:3)
kut+1 = [(1   u)kut + xut]=(1 + ): (4:4)
As before, all variables are in per-capita units, and there is growth in population at rate
 and growth in technologies at rate 
. The relative price of intangible investment and
consumption is qt. The rental rates for capital are denoted by r, and the wage rate for
labor is denoted by w. Inputs are paid their marginal products.
The tax system in the model economy mimics the U.S. system. There are taxes on
consumption c, measured wages h, tangible capital (that is, property) k, investment x,
prots p, and distributions d. We use  to denote the fraction of intangible investment
nanced by capital owners.9 Note that qtxut is expensed investment nanced by the
capital owners who have lower prots with increased investment. The amount (1 )qtxut
is sweat investment nanced by workers who have lower compensation with increased
investment.
4.1. Parameters
Before comparing the model predictions to the data, we need to choose parameters. In
this section, we report and motivate our choices.
For growth and interest rates, we use estimates based on U.S. trends. In particular,
we set growth in population at 1 percent ( = :01), growth in technology at 2 percent
9 The choice is irrelevant if there are no taxes. With taxes, the choice is all or none in the absence of
risk which might optimally be shared between capital owners and worker owners.
9(
 = :02), and the interest rate at 4.1 percent. These choices imply  = :98.
Given that changes in tax rates on capital were modest during the 1990s, we hold
these constant. We set p = 0:35 since most of the taxes on prots are corporate income
taxes. We set the distribution tax to be d = 0:15, which is slightly less than our estimate
in McGrattan and Prescott (2005a) for corporate distributions since noncorporate taxes
are not taxed twice. We set x = 0 since depreciation allowances, investment tax credits,
and investment taxes were negligible in the 1990s. Finally, we set the property tax rate at
k = 0:016, which is consistent with NIPA non-sales taxes on production and imports.
We use the same series for the tax on consumption that we used for Figure 1. For
the tax on labor we need to make one adjustment. Since we want to assume that h is
the tax rate on labor income excluding capital gains, we can either subtract the capital
gain tax receipts from receipts or include capital gains income to taxable income before
constructing our estimate of the tax rate.10
The share parameters and depreciation rates were chosen so that 1990 in the model
simulations looked like 1990 in U.S. time series.11 Our model, however, is designed to
account for activity in the business sector. U.S. corporate and noncorporate business
accounts for 75 percent of value added. We treat the remaining sector, which includes
households, nonprots, and government, as the \non-business" sector and treat investment,
hours, and output in that sector as exogenous to households in our model.12
As a benchmark, we used the same technology for producing nal goods and intangible
capital. In this case, we found m = m = 0:254, u = u = :087, and m = :04 for the
10 We do the latter using income data reported by the BEA. These data are reported in the table
comparing NIPA personal income and the IRS's adjusted gross income.
11 There is no way to determine u. We chose 0 and experimented with other values to make sure our
main results did not change.
12 In Appendix A, we show specically how we categorize business and non-business activity for U.S. na-
tional accounts. We also describe some adjustments that must be made in light of our theory.
10business sector technologies when we matched the model and data for 1990.
The nal parameter to be set is , which is the fraction of intangible investment
nanced by capital owners. As we noted earlier, the only real ramication of this choice
is for tax payments. But the evidence in Figures 5 and 6 suggests that some investment
is being done by both shareholders and workers. As a benchmark, we chose 0.5 and then
experimented with other values. The main eect of varying  is a change in the eective
tax rates on labor and capital which, in turn, has some small eect on the level of intangible
capital.
4.2. Predictions for Hours
We showed that a key failure with the standard theory was evident in the intratemporal
condition (2:4) which does not hold for U.S. time series. In the model with intangible
investment, we have an alternative condition. For ease of comparison, rst assume that
there is no non-business sector. In this case, the intratemporal condition is
 (1 + ct)ct
1   ht












where ht = h1
t + h2
t and  = m + u. Note that the real wage in the standard model was
(1 )yt=ht. Here, the real wage for work producing nal goods and services is (1 )yt=h1
t,
re
ecting the fact that some hours are spent producing intangible capital. Thus, we have
the same expression as before except for the term h2
t=h1
t. If we do not account for this
term, then we are not correctly measuring the productivity and, hence, the wage.13
If we do include a non-business sector, then the relevant condition is
 (1 + ct)ct
1   ht












13 In standard sticky wage models, the condition (2:4) is replaced by a dynamic equation relating the
nominal wage to a markup over expected future marginal rates of substitution between consumption
and leisure. As McGrattan (2004) shows, however, the impact of monetary shocks in these models
is tiny. Given the magnitude of these shocks for the United States during the 1990s, these models
cannot account for the dramatic rise in hours and output.
11where ybt and h1
t is output and hours in production of nal goods and services in the
business sector, h2
t is business hours in production of intangible capital, and  hnt is non-
business hours assumed to be exogenous for our model household. Using (4:6), we have















(1   ht) (4:7)
h2
t = ht   h1
t    hnt: (4:8)
With observations on business value-added, consumption, total hours, non-business hours,
and tax rates, we directly infer the allocation of hours to production of nal goods and
services and to production of new intangible capital.
We know from the results in Figure 1 that movements in h2
t have to be sizable to
be consistent with these observations. In Figure 8, we plot the ratio h2
t=ht. As expected,
there is a sizable increase starting in 1992. The fraction rises from 2.7 percent to 7.7
percent by 2000. This 5 percent dierential is certainly much too large to be attributed to
mismeasurement in labor or consumption tax rates.
5. Two Tests of the Extended Theory
We now conduct two tests of the theory. The rst test is a check on the consistency of the
equilibrium of our model. The second test compares the model's prediction for household
holding gains with the Flow of Funds estimates.
5.1. A First Test
The rst test can be summarized as follows. Are there paths of sectoral TFPs fA1
t;A2
tg
that imply an equilibrium of the model that is consistent with U.S. observations? If the
answer is no, then this theory is not useful for predicting what was happening during the
121990s U.S. boom. If the answer is yes, then this theory is potentially useful for predicting
the size of intangible investments and the patterns for actual output per hour.
Above we showed that the intratemporal condition relating the marginal rate of sub-
stitution to the after-tax wage rate gives us an expression for sectoral hours in terms of
U.S. observations. If we had observations on all investments and capital stocks, we could
use (4:1) and (4:2) to back out total factor productivities in the two sectors, feed these
estimates of TFP into the model, and compute equilibrium responses of the household.
Since we do not have observations on all investments and capital, we have to use
additional equilibrium relations to back out the sequences of TFPs. In Appendix B, we
describe the steps used to derive sequences for A1
t and A2
t. The main idea is to equate
returns to capital in order to determine the sectoral allocation of capital stocks. The
resulting sequences for TFPs are plotted in Figure 9 along with the standard measure of
TFP: GDP divided by K:33
mtH:67
t , where Kmt is total measured capital and Ht is total
hours. All series are real and relative to trend.
The standard measure falls slightly over the period but stays close to trend. The
implied TFPs for the model with intangible investment, on the other hand, show large
increases. In the sector producing nal goods and services, the increase is about 6 percent.
In the sector producing intangible capital, the increase is close to 17 percent.
We now take a second look at the U.S. data through the lens of the model with
intangible investment. We feed in the series for TFP in Figure 9 implied by the model along
with varying tax rates on market wages and consumption. In Figure 10, we display the
results for total hours. The predicted and actual series track each other very closely. The
model predicts that hours used to produce nal goods and services actually fall somewhat.
But, hours spent building intangible capital rise signicantly, implying a large overall
increase in hours.
13In Figure 11, we display the results for measured labor productivity or GDP per hour.
The model's prediction for GDP tracks the actual NIPA series closely. Thus, we also get
a very close match with labor productivity.
The largest deviation between the model and U.S. time series is in the comparison
of actual and predicted tangible investment. These series are plotted in Figure 12. The
model prediction is sensitive to the choice of capital taxation which we xed over the
period. However, even with the assumption of constant capital taxes, the model does well
in predicting the rise and fall of tangible investment.
5.2. A Second Test
Thus far, we have only checked on the model's consistency since we inferred TFP sequences
from the model's equilibrium relations and U.S. labor and national income data. In this
section, we consider a more signicant test of the theory by comparing the estimates of the
increase in capital gains from expensed and sweat equity to U.S. household holding gains
reported in the Flow of Funds accounts. The latter were not used to derive our measures
of TFPs.
Household holding gains reported in the U.S. Flow of Funds are the change in the
net worth of households after accounting for net investment. If Flow of Funds accountants
recorded holding gains for our model households, they would compute dierences in the
total value of businesses (for which the household is the residual claimant). The value of
all businesses in t is
Vt = (1   dt)(1 + xt)Km;t+1 + [(1   dt)(1   pt) + (1   )(1   ht)]qtKu;t+1; (5:1)
where capital letters denote aggregates. The rst term in (5:1) is the value of tangible
capital and the second term is the value of intangible capital. Notice that the price of
intangible capital depends on  since incomes to capital and incomes to labor are taxed
14dierently.
The change in the value V does not exactly re
ect the additional income in the
model economy. The additional income is qtXut (in units of the nal goods and services).
However, during periods when there are large investments of intangible capital, the increase
in holding gains, as dened in the Flow of funds, is a good approximation to the increase
in intangible investment.
In Figure 13, we plot an estimate of U.S. real holding gains relative to GDP using data
from the Board of Governor's Flow of Funds accounts and NIPA. To illustrate that the
late 1990s and early 2000s were special, we show these estimates annually back to 1953.
Starting in 1995, there is a signicant break in the series. Prior to 1995 it averages around
6 percent of GDP. For the period 1995{2003, the average is 12 percent. A dierence of 6
percent of GDP is indeed large.
Because our theory does not provide any explanation for the huge swings in asset
prices, we compare the model's predicted gains with the U.S. averages. We also have to
make an adjustment for foreign gains because our model includes only domestic sectors.
Since many domestic corporations have foreign subsidiaries, the value of the U.S. corpo-
rations includes equity from foreign capital, and the holding gains include gains from this
foreign capital. We estimate the gain by assuming that the ratio of after-tax foreign cor-
porate prots (excluding gains) to after-tax domestic corporate prots (excluding gains) is
equal to the ratio of foreign to domestic holding gains. With this assumption, our estimate
of foreign gains relative to total gains is approximately 23 percent on average for the period
1990{2003.
In Figure 14, we show the U.S. average holding gains along with the estimated holding
gains for the model. Both rise signicantly in the late 1990s. The rise is coincident with
the dramatic rise in hours. In this sense, the model passes a critical test.
156. Implications for Productivity and Investment
What does all of this mean for U.S. productivity and investment? If some output is
unmeasured relative to inputs, then productivity estimates are biased downward. If the
mismeasurement is intangible investment, then the investment estimates are biased down-
ward.
In Figure 15, we compare two measures of labor productivity for the model: GDP per
hour and total output per hour. The rst excludes intangible investment and the second
includes it. Both are detrended by 2 percent annually and set equal to 1 in 1990. Notice
how dierent the predictions are during this period. Measured productivity, which is what
national accountants would record if put in our economy, shows a signicant fall relative
to trend until 1997 and then the economy is roughly on trend. But actual productivity
shows that the economy is roughly on trend starting in 1993 and then in 1995 the economy
is above trend. These are very dierent predictions.
In Figure 16, we compare two measures of investment for the model: tangible invest-
ment and tangible plus intangible investment. Both are detrended by 2 percent annually
and normalized to 1 in 1990. Between 1991 and 1999, tangible investment rose by al-
most 20 percent. Total investment, however, rose by more than 30 percent. Again, the
predictions|with and without intangible investment|are very dierent.
In Figure 17 we display intangible investment as a share of total output. Total output
is GDP plus intangible investment. The bottom line of our study is that it is large and
increased signicantly in the late 1990s. Hence, standard accounting measures do not
highlight what was actually going on in the U.S. economy during this period.
167. Conclusions
Many business cycle analysts consider the 1990s to be a prime example that Federal Reserve
policy has important consequences for the economy. This reasoning is typically made
by a process of elimination: there is little change in TFP and tax rates, so changes in
the economy must have been driven by monetary factors. As Mankiw (2002) lucidly
summarizes, \No aspect of U.S. policy in the 1990s is more widely hailed as a success than
monetary policy. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan is often viewed as a miracle worker."
This paper takes a dierent perspective. We look at the data with the view that
unmeasured investments are potentially important. In McGrattan and Prescott (2005a),
we found that intangible capital was important for estimating the value of corporate equity.
Here, we considered the impact of intangible capital on hours, output, and productivity.
Our clues are the dramatic increase in hours that occurred before an increase in output
and the large rise in capital gains at the end of the 1990s. Using data for the United States,
we infer that sweat investment was large in the U.S. boom of the 1990s. We show that
ignoring this investment leads to a very distorted view of the performance of the economy.
17Appendix A. Model Accounts
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the adjustments that are made to the national
accounts so that the accounts are consistent with our theory.
In Table A, part I, we construct our measure of domestic business value added. This
measure is close to, but not exactly the same as, the sum of the value added of corporate
business, sole proprietorships and partnerships, and other private business as dened in
the NIPA tables. In our table, we note the source of these NIPA series. Two adjustments,
made in line 20 and in line 25, imply that our estimate of domestic business value added
is lower than NIPA's by an amount equal to .049 GDP. The rst adjustment (line 20)
removes the personal business expense for handling life insurance and pension plans from
net interest. We treat these nancial services included in NIPA as intermediate rather than
as nal. The second adjustment (line 25) removes sales tax from taxes on production and
imports. Our model output does not include consumption taxes as part of consumption
and as part of value added, but the BEA does.
In Table A, part II, we construct our measure of domestic non-business value added.
This measure is close to, but not exactly the same as, the sum of value added of house-
holds, nonprots, general government, and government enterprises. Three adjustments are
made. We add depreciation of consumer durables (line 5), subtract sales taxes (line 24),
and add imputed capital services for consumer durables and government capital (line 25).
Adjustments for consumer durables are necessary because we include consumer durables
with investment while the BEA includes durables with consumption. Services for govern-
ment capital are included because the BEA does not impute any value to the service. We
assume a rate of return equal to 4.1 percent which is an estimate of the return on other
types of capital.
In Table, part III, we construct our measure of gross domestic product. The adjust-
18ments noted above are also included in product, so that income and product balance. We
have also categorized tangible investment into business and non-business as in the case
of incomes. That is, investments of corporations and noncorporate business are included
with business investment, and investments of households, nonprots, and government are
included with non-business investment.
To be consistent, we also categorize hours from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
as business or non-business. Using the March supplement (through www.ipums.org), we
construct business hours as the sum of hours for the self-employed|both incorporated and
unincorporated|and hours for private wage and salary workers less hours for employees
in nonprots. Because private wage and salary workers include employees at nonprots,
we use BEA data on compensation in nonprots and, assuming an average wage rate equal
to the economy wide average, we can infer hours for nonprots. Hours in the non-business
sector are found by subtracting business hours from the total. We use the hours from the
March supplement sample to compute the fractions of hours in business and non-business.
We multiply these fractions by total hours in the monthly CPS sample for our nal series.
19Table A. Revised National Accounts, Averages Relative to GDP, 1990{2003
I. Domestic Business Value Added
1 Domestic Business Value Added 0.700
2 Consumption of xed capital 0.082
3 Corporate business (NIPA 7.5) 0.067
4 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 7.5) 0.013
5 Other private business (NIPA 7.5) 0.003
6 Labor Income 0.469
7 Compensation of employees 0.421
8 Corporate business (NIPA 1.13) 0.382
9 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 1.13) 0.036
10 Other private business (NIPA 1.13) 0.002
11 70% Proprietors' income with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.13) 0.049
12 Capital Income 0.149
13 Corporate prots with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.13) 0.073
14 30% Proprietors' income with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.13) 0.021
15 Rental income of persons with CCadj (NIPA 1.13) 0.006
16 Net interest and miscellaneous payments 0.022
17 Corporate business (NIPA 1.13) 0.014
18 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 1.13) 0.012
19 Other private business (NIPA 1.13) 0.005
20 Less: Intermediate nancial servicesa (NIPA 2.5.5) 0.009
21 Taxes on production and importsb 0.026
22 Corporate business (NIPA 1.13) 0.056
23 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 1.13) 0.008
24 Other private business (NIPA 1.13) 0.002
25 Less: Sales tax (NIPA 3.5) 0.040
See footnotes at the end of the table.
20Table A. Revised National Accounts (Cont.)
II. Domestic Non-business Value Added
1 Domestic Non-business Value Added 0.337
2 Consumption of xed capital 0.099
3 Households 0.084
4 Excluding consumer durables (NIPA 7.5) 0.012
5 Consumer durables (FOF F10) 0.062
6 Nonprots (NIPA 7.5) 0.004
7 General government (NIPA 7.5) 0.018
8 Government enterprises (NIPA 7.5) 0.003
9 Labor Income 0.154
10 Compensation of employees 0.154
11 Households (NIPA 1.13) 0.001
12 Nonprots (NIPA 1.13) 0.042
13 General government (NIPA 1.13) 0.099
14 Government enterprises (NIPA 1.13) 0.012
15 Capital Income 0.083
16 Current surplus of government enterprises (NIPA 1.13) 0.001
17 Rental income of persons with CCadj (NIPA 1.13) 0.008
18 Net interest and miscellaneous payments 0.033
19 Households (NIPA 1.13) 0.031
20 Nonprots (NIPA 1.13) 0.002
21 Taxes on production and importsb 0.004
22 Households (NIPA 1.13) 0.011
23 Nonprots (NIPA 1.13) 0.001
24 Less: Sales tax (NIPA 3.5) 0.007
25 Imputed capital servicesc 0.038
26 Household, consumer durables 0.013
27 Government capital 0.025
See footnotes at the end of the table.
21Table A. Revised National Accounts (Cont.)
III. Domestic Value Added and Product
1 Total Adjusted Domestic Income 1.043
2 Domestic Business Value Added 0.700
3 Domestic Non-business Value Added 0.337
4 Statistical Discrepancy 0.006
5 Total Adjusted Domestic Product 1.043
6 Private consumption 0.618
7 Personal consumption expenditures (NIPA 1.1.5) 0.678
8 Less: Consumer durables (NIPA 1.1.5) 0.083
9 Less: Intermediate nancial servicesa (NIPA 2.5.5) 0.009
10 Less: Sales tax, nondurables and services (NIPA 3.5) 0.042
11 Plus: Consumer durable depreciation (FOF F10) 0.062
12 Plus: Imputed capital servicesc 0.013
13 Public consumption (NIPA 3.1) 0.179
14 Government consumption expenditures (NIPA 3.1) 0.154
15 Plus: Imputed capital servicesc 0.025
16 Business tangible investmentd 0.112
17 Corporate gross private domestic investment (FOF F6) 0.092
18 Noncorporate gross private domestic investment (FOF F6) 0.020
19 Non-business tangible investment 0.134
20 Household 0.114
21 Excluding consumer durables (FOF F6) 0.036
22 Consumer durables (NIPA 1.1.5) 0.083
23 Less: Sales tax, durables (NIPA 3.5) 0.005
24 Nonprots (FOF F6) 0.007
25 Government investment (NIPA 3.1) 0.033
26 Net exports of goods and services (NIPA 1.1.5)  0:021
NOTE: IVA, inventory valuation adjustment; CCadj, capital consumption adjustment.
a Expense is for handling life insurance and pension plans.
b This category includes business transfers and excludes subsidies.
c Imputed capital services are equal to 4.1% times the current-cost net stock of government xed assets
and consumer durables goods.
d Ten percent of farm business is in corporate, with the remainder in noncorporate.
22Appendix B. Deriving Total Factor Productivities
We start with observables.14 Let xmt be measured tangible investment, which is the sum
of business tangible (xbt) plus non-business tangible ( xnt). We have sequences for all three
tangible series. Let ht be total hours, which is the sum of business hours h1
t +h2
t and non-
business hours  hnt. We have sequences for total business hours and non-business hours.
Let ymt be measured output (GDP) which is the sum of business output of production of
nal goods and services ybt and non-business output  ynt. We have sequences for all three
of these output series. Finally, we have series for consumption, assumed to be the sum of
private and public consumption, and for tax rates.
Now, we are ready to use the model's equilibrium conditions. We use (4:7) and (4:8)
to infer the allocation of hours within the business sector. Let yut = qtxut. Equating wage
rates implies
yut =
(1   m   u)h2
t
(1   m   u)h1
t
ybt:
Given observables and fyutg, the sequences for kut and qt are chosen to satisfy
yut=qt + (1   u)kut = kut+1
qt(1=ct)[(1   )(1   ht + (1   pt)(1   dt)]=(1 + ct)
= (1=ct+1)=(1 + ct+1)
[qt+1((1   )(1   ht+1) + (1   pt+1)(1   dt+1))(1   m)
+ (1   pt+1)(1   dt+1)(uybt+1 + uyut+1)=kut+1]
given initial conditions for capital. Finally, we use the production technologies along with
outputs, capital stocks, and hours to back out the time series for TFPs.
14 For more details on how we construct the observable time series, see Appendix A.
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25Figure 1
Total Hours of Work for the U.S. and the Model



















































































































































Average Weekly Hours of Noninstitutional Population 16{64 and
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32Figure 8
Fraction of Hours Spent in Production of Intangible Capital
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U.S. Household Real Holding Gains Relative to GDP
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